This article opens the special issue by identifying the main contributions to date of the empirical and theoretical literature on terrorism. Important past theoretical articles investigated the application of game theory to study interactions among adversaries (e.g., terrorists and
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Some preliminaries
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims. The key ingredients in this definition concern the political or social objective, the nonstate perpetrator, and the need for a large audience. Violence for nonpolitical goals -e.g., a kidnapping for ransom, not intended to promote a political agenda -is a crime, but is not terrorism. If the perpetrator is a state, then state terrorism results. Although state terrorism is an important concern, it is not the terrorism that is addressed in the special issue. Finally, terrorists want a large audience to feel at risk so that public pressures are applied to officeholders or rulers to concede terrorists' demands for change. To create this general atmosphere of fear, terrorists engage in various types of operations -kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, hijackings, and armed attacks -in a seemingly random fashion so that everyone feels in jeopardy. But in fact, these attacks are not random; instead, terrorists trade off risk and return when choosing their targets. Soft, high-valued targets are particularly attractive. Terrorism is a tactic of the weak to deploy against the strong. With a carefully planned and executed campaign, small groups of extremists may effectively use violence to gain a presence. Even though governments seldom cave in to terrorist demands, 1 these campaigns can still have many deleterious effects -e.g., a general sense of fear or restrictions on civil liberties -on targeted societies. Governments may have to spend heavily on counterterrorism measures that raise taxes and divert public moneys from more productive activities.
An important distinction used at various places in the special issue is that of domestic versus transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism involves perpetrators, targets, victims, venues, and audience in the same country. The kidnapping of a local politician by a domestic terrorist group to promote political change at home is an example of domestic terrorism. November 1979 by radical Islamic students was another instance of transnational terrorism.
Transnational terrorism is more difficult than domestic terrorism to address owing to the need for international cooperation, which faces many roadblocks -e.g., the unwillingness of nations to sacrifice their autonomy and control over national security matters.
Another distinction germane to some of the articles in this special issue (e.g., Arce, Croson & Eckel, 2011; Bapat, 2011; Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011) concerns the two types of counterterrorism policies. Defensive policy involves hardening targets through protective measures that make it more costly for terrorists to attack successfully. Defensive measures also limit the damage in case of an attack. Often, defensive measures are reactivee.g., checking shoes at airport security after the shoe bomber, or deploying full-body imagers after the underwear bomber. In the case of transnational terrorism, defensive measures can give rise to targeted countries engaging in a 'protection race' in the hopes of transferring attacks abroad. This inclination is attenuated if a country has assets and citizens abroad, because the transfer can jeopardize the country's own interests abroad. The same inducement to transfer attacks to other venues is not a concern for domestic terrorism insofar as a central government oversees such defensive decisions, unlike the case of transnational terrorism, and does not gain from such transfers. The other category of counterterrorism consists of proactive or offensive measures, which seek to limit or destroy terrorist resources. Proactive responses involve the infiltration of terrorist groups, the collecting of intelligence, the curbing of terrorist finances, and the destroying of terrorist training camps. For transnational terrorism, there is a marked tendency to do too little proactive operations, because one country's actions against a common terrorist threat provide a pure public good to all targeted countries.
Articles in the special issue
The Enders & Jindapon (2011) article applies game theory to contrast two alternative strategies of detainees, which may include terrorists or soldiers in the 'war on terror.' One strategy -Big 4 -requires a prisoner to provide only his or her name, rank, serial number, and birth date, while the other strategy -Little Fish -allows a prisoner to give useful verifiable information. In the latter case, this information causes limited harm to the detainee's group or government; nevertheless, the information demonstrates that the prisoner is cooperating. If this strategy works and more extreme interrogation methods are not subsequently applied, then the detainee and the interests that he or she represents may be protected, because more damaging information may not be extracted under duress. In contrast, the Big 4 strategy will result in harsher In addition, foreign assistance may be more easily justified by targeted countries to support a recipient country's efforts to curb transnational, rather than domestic, terrorism. A comparison and contrast between domestic and transnational terrorism is missing from the literature; Enders, incidents, and lagged terrorism) are used with little change in the findings that transnational terrorism had a significant negative growth effect, while domestic terrorism did not have a significant growth impact. This finding holds despite the fact that domestic terrorist events far outnumbered transnational terrorist events.
The analysis shows that internal and external conflicts resulted in 1 to 2% loss in annual growth, consistent with the civil war literature. Additional estimates account for the GDP share of government spending, trade openness, democracy, population, and population growth. The fairly modest impact of transnational terrorism on growth informs policy on how much counterterrorism expenditure is justified for addressing transnational terrorism. Of course, there are other grounds for curbing transnational terrorism based on lost lives and political instability.
The study shows that wars are a much larger growth concern.
The Arce, Croson & Eckel (2011) and assessing some theoretical propositions associated with the economic study of counterterrorism -e.g., commonly targeted governments will spend too little on proactive measures. Under controlled circumstances, the experimental approach can provide data to evaluate some counterterrorism propositions.
Arce, Croson & Eckel focus on four research questions. The first area involves interdependent security games where the security choice and safety of one player hinge on the security choice of other players. An apt example is airline security where each flight's safety depends on how well its air carrier screened its own luggage and how well transferred luggage had been screened by other airlines. Generally, transferred luggage is not rescreened. A second area concerns 'Colonel Blotto' games in which two adversaries -say, a terrorist and government -must allocate resources at vulnerable points (targets). This application is particularly germane to the study of defensive countermeasures where the authorities protect alternative terrorist targets at home. These authorities must determine which targets are defended and by how much.
Additionally, they need to decide which targets are left undefended. A third area is the global security game, first introduced by Sandler & Lapan (1988) , where a transnational terrorist group targets two or more countries. These countries must decide between defensive and proactive countermeasures, while accounting for the anticipated response of other targeted countries.
Elements of public good and commons games figure into the analysis. A fourth area involves punishment and vendettas leveled against free riders. In the terrorism context, the free riders may be countries that rely on the proactive measures of other countries.
The Blomberg, Hess & Tan (2011) article is the first study to relate terrorism and trust.
The latter is measured by survey data, drawn from the World Values Survey (WVS) at four snapshots in time -1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 . In particular, trust is measured by the percentage of respondents in each country who answered that 'most people can be trusted.' The mean share measure for trust in the surveyed countries is 0.27, or 27% of respondents answered yes to the trust question. The authors conduct two estimation exercises: (i) one regresses the probability of trust on a set of independent variables, and (ii) another regresses the level of average income of individuals on a set of independent variables, including trust. This latter equation allows the authors to distinguish the direct effect of terrorism on income levels from the indirect effect via terrorism-induced trust reduction. In the trust equation, independent variables include a terrorism measure, a war measure, individual-level controls (e.g., education, age, marital status, and employment status), and social capital measures. In the income equation, independent variables include a terrorism measure, a war measure, trust, and individual-level controls. Throughout their study, the authors' terrorism measures involve only transnational terrorism, as drawn from ITERATE.
The trust regressions show that transnational terrorism had a significant negative influence on trust, which is far smaller than that of war in most of the estimates. Consistent with other trust studies, the authors find that higher education, age, and marriage augmented trust, while unemployment status decreased trust. Transnational terrorism had a large negative influence on income levels, with subsequent regressions showing that poor people were harmed much more than rich people. The direct negative impact of terrorism on income levels is much greater than the indirect negative impact through trust. In fact, the entire impact is only about 10% greater than the direct impact, so that income reduction via terrorism-induced losses in trust is modest. War and unemployment had a large adverse effect on income levels. These authors present a host of alternative estimation specifications to establish the robustness of their results.
The special issue concludes with a Special Data Feature contribution by Epifanio (2011). 
